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Abstract Motivation is often thought to enhance adaptive decision-making by biasing actions toward rewards and away from punishment. Emerging evidence, however, points to a more nuanced view whereby motivation can both enhance and impair different aspects of decision-making. Model-based approaches have gained prominence over the past decade for developing more precise mechanistic explanations for how incentives impact goal-directed behavior. In this Special Focus, we highlight three studies that demonstrate how computational frameworks help decompose decision processes into constituent cognitive components, as well as formalize when and how motivational factors (e.g., monetary rewards) influence specific cognitive processes, decision-making strategies, and self-report measures. Finally, I conclude with a provocative suggestion based on recent advances in the field: that organisms do not merely seek to maximize the expected value of extrinsic incentives. Instead, they may be optimizing decision-making to achieve a desired internal state (e.g., homeostasis, effort, affect). Future investigation into such internal processes will be a fruitful endeavor for unlocking the cognitive, computational, and neural mechanisms of motivated decision-making. 

To invest effort into any cognitive task, people must be sufficiently motivated. Whereas prior research has focused primarily on how the cognitive control required to complete these tasks is motivated by the potential rewards for success, it is also known that control investment can be equally motivated by the potential negative consequence for failure. Previous theoretical and experimental work has yet to examine how positive and negative incentives differentially influence the manner and intensity with which people allocate control. Here, we develop and test a normative model of control allocation under conditions of varying positive and negative performance incentives. Our model predicts, and our empirical findings confirm, that rewards for success and punishment for failure should differentially influence adjustments to the evidence accumulation rate versus response threshold, respectively. This dissociation further enabled us to infer how motivated a given person was by the consequences of success versus failure.